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Abstract 
Capital account convertibility in China is on the rise. Some see the process as a means of 
circumventing domestic financial sector inefficiency while others view it as potentially 
exposing China to financial crises. In considering these different viewpoints, this paper 
attempts to quantify the impact that opening the capital account will have on the volume 
of China’s international capital flows. It is found that were China to fully open its capital 
account, gross non-FDI capital flows are predicted to rise by around 4.6 percent of 
GDP. While an increase of this magnitude would present a prudential challenge for 
China’s monetary authorities, it does not appear to be large enough to seriously call into 
question financial sector stability, either in China or abroad.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital account convertibility in China is on the rise. Capital account convertibility refers 
to the freedom that private agents have in converting local financial assets into foreign 
financial assets and vice versa at market determined rates of exchange. Some aspects of 
China’s capital account liberalization have even been placed on a set timetable. WTO 
entry in 2001, for example, committed China to extending national treatment to foreign 
banks within five years. This would, in a radical departure from historical practice, allow 
foreign banks to compete freely with domestic financial institutions in providing RMB 
denominated financial services to Chinese firms and individuals. In addition, the 
Common Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed by China and Hong Kong 
SAR that came into effect on 1 January 2004 offers Hong Kong firms numerous WTO-
plus concessions ahead of China’s WTO schedule, as well as increasing the flow of 
tourists (and the capital they bring) from the mainland into Hong Kong.  Another notable 
policy that impacts on the degree of capital account convertibility is the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme introduced in 2003, which for the first time allowed 
foreigners to engage in portfolio investment in China’s A share market. In July 2005, the 
authorities announced an intention to raise the QFII quota from $US 4 billion to $US 10 
billion, more than doubling the amount that global money managers could invest in RMB 
denominated securities. Capital account liberalization has also taken on an outward 
looking orientation with the gradual implementation of the “go abroad” strategy. This 
strategy provides recorded blessing and sometimes the financial wherewithal for Chinese 
companies to expand their operations overseas via direct and portfolio investment.1  
 
As in other countries, rising capital account convertibility presents China with immense 
opportunities and challenges. Chief amongst these is the question of what impact it will 
have on investment efficiency and financial sector stability. Some see capital account 
liberalization making a positive impact in both respects (see, for example, Dorn 2003). 
This view holds that despite its overall economic success, China still maintains an 
underdeveloped financial sector, where the lending decisions of the dominant state-
                                                 
1 It has been reported that the volume of transactions involving a Chinese buyer and an international target 
jumped from $2 billion-3 billion in previous years to almost $23 billion for 2005 (The Economist 2005). 
  
2
 
owned banks are based more on government prerogatives than the productivity of capital. 
By opening up the capital account, those borrowers who have been starved of capital 
under the administrative rationing system, such as private sector firms, will have better 
access to credit, and the increased participation of foreign financial institutions could also 
press domestic financial institutions to undertake much needed reform.  
 
Yet if capital account liberalization involved nothing but an upside scenario, the 
pragmatic approach displayed by the Chinese authorities toward economic reform thus 
far means that the process would have been far more advanced than it currently is.  The 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s had a dramatic influence on policy making in 
China. For one, the experience of China’s neighbors amply demonstrated that without 
first establishing a highly competent prudential framework, liberalizing the capital 
account needs not improve investment efficiency or financial sector stability. This is 
because financial markets and institutions are extremely vulnerable to market failure, 
particularly those pertaining to imperfect information and moral hazard (Stiglitz 1994). 
Secondly, while China may have escaped the full impact of the crisis due to its relatively 
closed capital account, the event still managed to claim the country’s second largest non-
bank financial institution, the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company 
(GITIC). The experience of GITIC mirrored that of many financial institutions 
throughout the region. GITIC grew rapidly on the back of aggressive borrowing from 
overseas as its close association with the provincial-level government secured ample 
lending from foreign financial institutions who assumed the default risk was essentially 
zero. Much of GITIC’s foreign borrowing was used to fund speculative investments, 
especially in the property markets.  At the time of its ultimate collapse, GITIC has 
registered foreign currency borrowings of $US1.2 billion. After liquidation proceedings 
has been completed, it was found that the company had also flouted prudential 
requirements that foreign borrowings be registered and GITIC’s total foreign debts, 
which came from over 130 foreign banks, actually doubled the registered amount 
(Xinhua News Agency 2003). The fact that banks dominate China’s financial system 
meant that the collapse of GITIC was not of a sufficient scale to place the system at any 
real risk. The lesson that it provided however was clear.  
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As real as the downside scenario of capital account liberalization may be, the trepidation 
over it has been greatly exacerbated by the fact that the existing literature provides little 
guidance to stakeholders regarding what the magnitude of the capital flow response might 
be. Yet the magnitude of the capital flow response compared with the size of other 
economic variables such as the current volume of international capital flows, the rate of 
gross capital formation and the existing stockpile of foreign exchange reserves is a key 
issue. For example, if it can be shown that the capital flows response is likely to be small 
relative to the above variables, then concerns that rising capital account convertibility 
might significantly and negatively impact on China’s investment efficiency and the 
stability of its financial system and those overseas can be greatly obviated.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the above question. In particular, we 
consider the impact that rising capital account convertibility will have on the volume of 
China’s gross (i.e., inflows plus outflows) non-foreign direct investment flows, namely 
foreign portfolio investment and other foreign investment (e.g., bank loans) (FPOI). The 
reason for focusing on FPOI is because these types of capital flows have the greatest 
scope to respond to capital account liberalization in the future. Table 1 shows that while 
China’s gross foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP had caught up to 
the world average by the early 1990s, FPOI actually began to lag even further behind 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. This outcome is not surprising as liberalization policies 
in the past have strongly favored FDI over FPOI (Laurenceson & Chai 2003). Another 
reason is that most of the concerns relating to rising capital account convertibility are 
related to FPOI. While direct investment typically involves a long-term commitment to 
the host country, portfolio investment and banks loans are far more vulnerable to serving 
speculative ends and more subject to abrupt reversal. The reason for focusing on gross 
flows rather than inflows or outflows is simply data availability. Still, given that inflows 
or outflows must necessarily be less than the gross value, by focusing on the gross figure 
we can effectively establish an upper bound against which other relevant variables can be 
compared.  
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Table 1. Gross Private Capital Flows of FDI from 1981 to 2003 
  1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-03 
FDI       
 China 0.46 1.13 4.88 4.97 4.67 
 World 1.30 2.15 2.15 5.55 5.46 
 High income country 1.40 2.40 2.19 6.03 5.87 
 Upper middle income country 1.79 1.31 2.33 4.26 4.04 
 Lower middle income country 0.55 0.73 1.92 3.51 3.83 
 Low income country 0.31 0.39 0.84 1.59 1.57 
FPOI       
 China 1.45 1.62 1.91 5.91 6.16 
 World 6.13 7.71 9.52 16.24 17.46 
 High income country 6.29 8.31 10.12 18.25 19.54 
 Upper middle income country 12.08 9.96 9.27 8.66 9.96 
 Lower middle income country 2.88 2.89 5.45 8.16 7.99 
 Low income country 2.08 2.18 3.83 4.01 2.83 
 
To consider the capital flow response we construct an econometric model that can 
satisfactorily explain FPOI in terms of a number of explanatory variables, including a 
variable that represents a sliding scale of capital account openness. Based on the observed 
values of these explanatory variables for China, we can then use this model to estimate 
not only an expected value for what China’s FPOI would be if the capital account were 
fully opened but also that at various degrees of openness. While there are many studies 
looking at the impact of China’s deepening engagement in the international trade of 
goods and services, very few examine the same issue on the financial side of 
globalization. McKibbin and Tang (1998) is a noticeable exception. They use a 
computable dynamic general equilibrium model to simulate the effect of a decline in the 
wedge between the return on investing in Chinese assets and assets in the rest of the 
world. While that is a novel method in analyzing the structural change of the economy 
following an opening of the capital account, the fact that the model was not calibrated to 
China data2 means that the numerical findings are largely suggestive. In contrast, our 
regression-based method makes use of the most recent data for China (as well as those for 
                                                 
2 Except the risk premium data. 
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90 other countries) and can therefore provide some quantitative results that are 
instrumental to the current debate. Also, our econometric analysis takes into account both 
economic and institutional factors, the latter of which is measured by a comprehensive 
index of governance recently developed by the World Bank. This institutional factor, 
which has not been considered in previous studies, is found to be crucial in determining 
the capital flow response. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section two first defines a method to account for 
unrecorded FPOI flows. This is important as the existence of unofficial channels through 
which capital can cross borders means that a country’s actual degree of openness might 
be far higher than its de jure regime and recorded data suggest. How capital account 
openness can be measured is also discussed.  Section three outlines the econometric 
model used to investigate the determinants of FPOI.  Section four presents the estimation 
results and discusses the findings. Section five concludes.   
 
2. UNRECORDED CAPITAL FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
OPENNESS 
Numerous studies have pointed to non-trivial volumes of capital entering and leaving 
China through unofficial channels (Eichengreen 2004; Wu & Tang 2000). During the 
Asian financial crisis, the evidence pointed to a surge in capital flight, i.e., unrecorded 
capital outflows. Since 2001, speculation of an impending RMB appreciation meant that 
capital flight has given way to inflows of hot money. What these unrecorded capital flows 
imply is that the recorded data relating to FPOI might substantially underestimate actual 
FPOI (AFPOI) and that de facto capital account convertibility is higher than the de jure 
regime would imply. In terms of our econometric analysis, such flows must be accounted 
for otherwise the model’s predictions would tend to overstate the expected capital flow 
response to liberalization.  
 
Table 2 explains how we account for unrecorded FPOI flows. First, we make use of a 
common technique that draws on balance of payments statistics accounting identities to 
come up with an estimate of AFPOI, in net terms. Genuine errors and omission aside, 
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changes in a country’s foreign reserve holdings should be attributable to either the current 
account balance and / or net capital inflows. As changes in reserve holdings, the current 
account balance and FDI are usually deemed more easily accounted for than FPOI, net 
AFPOI can then be estimated as a residual3 (Row 5, Table 2).  Net AFPOI can then be 
broken down into recorded and unrecorded components. Unrecorded net FPOI is equal to 
net AFPOI minus recorded net FPOI, the latter of which can be calculated as the 
difference between total net private capital flows and net FDI flows (Row 8, Table 2). 
The estimates of unrecorded net FPOI seem plausible. For most of the period, the 
estimated figures suggest that unrecorded FPOI outflows exceeded unrecorded inflows. 
This was particularly the case during the period of the Asian financial crisis when there 
were expectations of China devaluing the RMB. Since 2001 this tendency had slowed 
and by 2003, when expectations of an impending RMB revaluation had reached fever-
pitched levels, unrecorded inflows exceeded unrecorded outflows.  
 
                                                 
3 Many other authors, such as Prasad and Wei (2005), also use this methodology. While being a reasonable 
assertion, there are clearly problems that also occur in accurately measuring the current account surplus 
(e.g., the mis-invoicing of exports and imports) and the level of FDI (e.g., “round trip” capital of Chinese 
origin and FPOI entering the country in the guise of FDI in order to take advantage of the favourable 
policies extended to FDI) (Prasad & Wei 2005; Xiao 2004).  
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Table 2. China’s Capital Flows, 1996 – 2004 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total reserves, inc. gold 
($US billion) 108 143 150 158 169 219 295 457 
1 619 
Total reserve 
accumulation, inc. gold 
($US billion) 
32 36 6 9 11 50 77 162 207 
Current account surplus 
($US billion) 7 37 31 21 21 17 35 46 70 
Net FDI ($US billion) 2 38 42 41 37 37 37 47 47 61 
Actual net FPOI ($US 
billion) -13 -43 -66 -49 -47 -4 -5 69 77 
Total recorded net 
private capital flows 
($US billion)  
49 58 42 37 41 41 47 60  
Recorded net FPOI ($US 
billion) 11 16 1 -1 4 4 0 13  
Unrecorded net FPOI 
($US billion) -24 -59 -67 -48 -51 -8 -5 56  
GDP 821 903 954 999 1079 1176 1271 1412 1593 
Recorded gross FPOI (%  
GDP) 1.4 5.8 5.9 8.0 8.3 5.4 3.3 9.8  
Unrecorded net FPOI (% 
GDP) -2.9 -6.5 -7.0 -4.8 -4.7 -0.7 -0.4 4.0  
Total actual = recorded 
gross FPOI plus absolute 
unrecorded net FPOI (% 
GDP) 
4.3 12.3 12.9 12.8 13.0 6.1 3.7 13.8  
Source – International Monetary Fund 
Notes – 
1. In 2003 the Chinese government used $US45 billion from its foreign reserves to recapitalize two state 
banks. As a result, the 2003 figure for total reserves is the recorded value plus $US 45 billion. The 2004 
figure is simply the recorded estimate.  
2. The FDI figure for 2004 it is not a net figure. It is simply inward FDI. The source is the National Bureau 
of Statistics. In previous years, outward FDI recorded in the national accounts has been very small. 
 
There is one problem associated with this method of estimating unrecorded FPOI – the 
data are in net rather than gross form. Fortunately, this is not a major weakness because, 
particularly in the context of developing countries, unrecorded FPOI flows during a 
certain period tend to be dominated by movements in one direction or another. For 
example, during the Asian financial crisis, unrecorded FPOI for China was much more 
likely to move abroad than the other way around. Similarly, in 2003 unrecorded FPOI 
was overwhelmingly moving into China. What this means is that the absolute value of the 
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net figure for unrecorded FPOI represents a lower bound estimation of the real gross 
figure. Thus, if we add the absolute value of the estimated net unrecorded FPOI to gross 
recorded FPOI, we can arrive at a reasonable approximation for AFPOI. Also, by 
calculating net AFPOI as a residual of other balance of payments variables, genuine net 
errors and omissions are also included. This will to some extent counteract any 
underestimation of gross AFPOI that results from adding net unrecorded FPOI to the 
recorded gross figures.    
 
Using the above method, it can be estimated that AFPOI for China has been averaging 
around 9.9 percent of GDP over the period of 1996-2003 (Row 12, Table 2). This 
compares with an average recorded FPOI figure of 6.0 percent (Row 12, Table 10). Thus, 
the estimates imply that unofficial channels for moving capital across the border have 
raised China’s FPOI flows by more than one half. Nonetheless, the estimated AFPOI 
figure remains considerably short of the world average and certainly below the average of 
high-income countries (Table 1). Therefore, it can be concluded that even after 
accounting for unrecorded capital flows, the potential for FPOI to respond to increases in 
capital account convertibility in the future remains considerable.  
 
Similar adjustments can also be made for other countries. Table 3 compares recorded 
FPOI figures with AFPOI figures for all 90 countries in our dataset. The figures presented 
are average values from the post Asian financial crisis period of 1999-2003, which is the 
time period covered by our later econometric analysis. For 22 mostly OECD countries no 
adjustment was undertaken. The reason for this is that the World Bank does not report net 
private capital flow data for these countries, which is needed to calculate unrecorded 
FPOI. This is not a particularly significant problem as these countries tend to have 
relatively few capital controls and so recorded data for FPOI will be close to the actual 
figure. The average ratio of estimated AFPOI to recorded FPOI across the other 68 
countries for which adjustments were made is 1.77, the median value is 1.44 and the 
range is 1.16 (Latvia) - 5.1 (Madagascar) As is the case with China, there is also a sharp 
rise in this ratio for other countries during years of financial turbulence. For example, in 
the case of Argentina, the ratio rose from 1.03 in 2001 to 1.45 in 2002, the year the 
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country was beset by a financial crisis. Likewise in Turkey the ratio rose from 1.05 in 
2000 to 1.41 in 2001. Somewhat paradoxically, while a large share of unrecorded capital 
flows implies that capital controls are being circumvented, the fact that it is much more 
pronounced during times of financial crises suggests that they continue to bite in terms of 
making unofficial channels relatively costly to use during non-crisis periods.  
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Table 3. Selected data from sample countries 
Sample country FPOI AFPOI KAO Sample country FPOI AFPOI KAO 
Albania 4.00 9.53 1 Japan 14.36  10.2 
Argentina 15.94 20.44 4.4 Jordan 13.55 16.79 9.8 
Armenia 8.87 15.82 11 Kazakhstan 14.51 27.42 1 
Australia 15.38  3.8 Kenya 6.42 8.83 7 
Austria 36.69  9 Korea, Rep. 8.21  1.6 
Azerbaijan 3.88 10.45 3 Kuwait 30.28  6 
Bangladesh 2.50 3.04 0.6 Kyrgyz Republic 8.29 18.19 6 
Belarus 3.24 6.12 1.8 Latvia 20.54 23.82 8.8 
Bolivia 6.44 11.66 9 Lithuania 10.43 15.24 8.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18.49 46.53 8.4 Macedonia, FYR 11.96 16.35 3 
Brazil 6.17 7.23 2.2 Madagascar 1.32 6.75 0 
Bulgaria 9.37 13.13 4.2 Mexico 4.11 5.81 2.6 
Burundi 4.85 8.41 1 Moldova 18.09 21.64 0 
Cambodia 6.90 8.83 4.2 Morocco 2.81 4.30 1.4 
Canada 10.60  11 Mozambique 9.50 23.31 0 
Cape Verde 8.11 17.18 1.8 Nepal 6.47 9.87 0.8 
Chile 16.25 41.84 4.2 Netherlands 61.56  12 
China 6.97 9.34 1.2 New Zealand 9.58  11 
Colombia 8.32 11.55 0.6 Nicaragua 4.71 19.23 10 
Congo, Rep. 22.27 33.23 0 Norway 22.38  8.4 
Cote d’Ivoire 6.36 7.56 0 Pakistan 2.57 3.41 1 
Croatia 20.50 26.76 1.2 Paraguay 6.86 9.33 11.2 
Czech Republic 14.16 17.35 7.6 Peru 5.20 6.45 11 
Denmark 21.91  11 Philippines 45.93 54.74 1 
Dominican Republic 8.22 13.33 5.6 Poland 7.19 8.84 1.8 
Ecuador 13.50 20.47 8 Portugal 37.11  8.8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6.19 8.61 6.4 Romania 5.66 8.01 3.2 
El Salvador 11.60 15.87 10.8 Russian Federation 10.54 20.06 1.6 
Estonia 19.39 25.22 8.2 Saudi Arabia 12.19 20.06 3 
Finland 38.23  8 Sierra Leone 4.07 16.08 2 
France 16.67  9.6 Slovenia 11.52  5.4 
Georgia 2.41 5.40 0 South Africa 10.91 14.69 1 
Germany 22.60  12 Spain 26.03  8.6 
Ghana 3.18 8.95 3 Sri Lanka 3.58 5.59 0 
Greece 17.14  10.2 Sudan 1.74 3.37 7.6 
Guatemala 15.48 21.41 9.6 Sweden 31.33  7 
Guyana 4.07 12.37 9 Thailand 9.41 13.92 1.8 
Haiti 2.34 3.01 2 Tunisia 4.72 6.15 1 
Honduras 4.18 7.26 5.4 Turkey 8.31 11.31 3 
Hungary 17.60 21.47 7.6 Uganda 1.70 5.61 11 
Iceland 33.94  5.2 Ukraine 10.61 14.26 1.4 
Indonesia 4.16 6.51 2 United Kingdom 55.14  11 
Israel 9.08  7.8 United States 8.72  9 
Italy 17.89  10.6 Uruguay 34.25 41.71 9.8 
Jamaica 17.41 20.30 6.8 Venezuela, RB 9.15 16.73 7.4 
    Yemen, Rep. 1.27 3.36 9 
 
How capital account openness might be measured is also a key issue that needs to be 
addressed before moving on to the econometric analysis. We make use of the IMF’s 
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Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions, which since 1996 has 
provided an annual qualitative assessment of the restrictions used by its member 
countries on 13 different types of capital account transactions. These include - 
transactions involving capital market securities, money market instruments, collective 
investment securities, derivatives and other instruments, commercial credits, financial 
credits, guarantees / sureties / financial back-up facilities, direct investment, liquidation 
of direct investment, real estate transactions, personal capital movements, provisions 
specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions and provisions specific to 
institutional investors. The IMF’s qualitative assessments can be codified by assigning a 
value of 1 if there is no restriction on a particular transaction type. As a result, a country 
that has no capital controls would receive a capital account openness score of 13. 
Conversely, a country with controls over all transaction types would receive a score of 0. 
We label the capital account openness variable as ‘KAO’.  Measuring capital account 
openness based on the IMF’s qualitative data is not without its limitations. For example, 
even within each transaction category there might be many different types of capital 
controls that could be employed. The IMF’s data effectively considers that a country with 
a single control in the area of particular transaction type is as closed as a country with 
numerous controls. The IMF data also does not comment on how strongly a particular 
type of control is enforced. Nonetheless, the IMF data does still offer a unique 
international dataset at a reasonable level of disaggregation and remains the preferred 
choice for many studies seeking to measure capital account openness (e.g., Miniane 2004; 
Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor 2005) 
 
The KAO values for China and all other countries in our sample are given in Table 3. The 
mean value of KAO for countries in which an adjustment for unrecorded capital flows 
was made is 4.5. This compares with 8.5 for those higher-income countries in which no 
adjustment was made. This observation is important for two reasons. Firstly, as it is 
known that higher income countries tend to have more open capital accounts, it is 
pleasing to see that whatever the limitations the IMF data may have, it does nonetheless 
account for differences in openness across countries reasonably well. Secondly, it also 
provides a justification for our earlier contention that in those mostly high-income 
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countries, for which net private capital flow data was unavailable, the recorded FPOI data 
should be a close approximation to the actual figure since these countries tend to have 
few capital controls.  
 
In Figure 1, we plot the distribution of KAO for 190 IMF member countries in 1999 and 
2003 respectively. It can be seen that over the five year period, there was a small shift 
toward greater openness around the globe. Nevertheless, there is a distinct bipolar pattern 
in both distributions in that about 50 percent of the countries had KAO scores equal to or 
smaller than 2, and over 25 percent had KAO scores equal to or greater than 9. One 
interpretation of this bipolar distribution is that a medium degree of capital account 
openness is difficult to maintain in practice rather than being less preferable in principal. 
A probable reason is that once a country has removed capital controls on certain 
transaction types then it would be hard to prevent capital destined for other transaction 
types from entering or leaving the country in disguised forms.  
 
Figure 1. The distribution of KAO of IMF member countries in 1999 and 2003. 
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There are 185 countries in 1999 and 187 countries in 2003. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 are scatter plots of KAO against FPOI and AFPOI, respectively. From 
Figure 2 it can be seen that FPOI seems to be positively related to KAO in general, 
though there is a widening dispersion of FPOI as KAO increases. Figure 3 shares a 
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similar pattern with Figure 2; however, the magnitude of AFPOI is evidently greater than 
the corresponding value of FPOI at the lower end of KAO, while there is little change at 
the higher end of KAO. This is expected because much fewer adjustments for unrecorded 
capital flows were made to the data for countries at the higher end of KAO. Furthermore, 
a comparison of the two figures indicate that unrecorded channels for capital flows are far 
from as effective as recorded ones, otherwise, the scatter plot between AFPOI and KAO 
would have a random rather than a (rough) upward sloping pattern. Beyond these general 
observations, however, we cannot draw more inference on a causal relationship between 
these two variables without controlling for other factors. To that end, we turn to our 
econometric analysis.  
 
Figure 2. Correlation between FPOI and KAO 
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Figure 3. Correlation between AFPOI and KAO 
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3. THE MODEL AND DATA 
The process of China opening up its capital account can be represented by increases in 
KAO from its current value of 1 up to the upper bound of 13. To examine the impact of 
such changes on China’s AFPOI, we first need to estimate an econometric model that can 
satisfactorily explain AFPOI in terms of a number of explanatory variables, including 
KAO. The specification of the model and data are explained below. 
The Model 
The regression model estimated is a cross section model of the following general form: 
 0 1 2i i i iAFPOI KAOα α ε= + + +α x  (1) 
where i is a country index, KAO a measure of capital account openness, ix  a vector of 
other explanatory variables, and iε  an i.i.d. error term; and AFPOI is measured as a 
percentage of GDP.  
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The vector ix  includes:  
- GDP: measured in PPP, constant international currency. The inclusion of GDP is 
to examine if there is any size effect as AFPOI is already expressed in percentage 
of GDP. 
- GDPC: GDP per capita measured in PPP, international currency. A richer country 
entails, as well as provides, more investment opportunities. 
- GPDCG: Growth rate of GDP per capita. A faster growing country would 
expectedly attract more foreign capital. 
- OPEN: Trade openness measured by the ratio of total trade value to GDP. 
Countries that are open to trade in goods and services also tend to be open to trade 
in capital, most obviously in trade-related finance. 
- FDI: Gross foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Dasgupta and 
Ratha (2000) show that FDI flows to developing countries are strongly associated 
with FPOI flows. This is not surprising given many driving factors of FDI and 
FPOI are in common, such as investment environments and market potential.  
- GOV: An index of governance. The index is included to capture the effects of the 
institutional environment on capital flows. We constructed this index using the 
principal components method. The underlying data series are from the World 
Bank, which every two years since 1996 has collected an extensive international 
data set on six aspects of governance include Voice and Accountability, Political 
Instability and Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law and Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2005). Data 
pertaining to the six aspects of governance are positively and highly correlated 
with one another to the extent that the first principal component extracted 
accounts for around 85 percent of the variance in the six underlying series. As a 
result, the first principal component is sufficient to construct our overall GOV 
index.  
- SAVE: Gross national saving rate. This and the next variable are intended to 
capture a country’s need to borrow from, or its ability to lend to, global financial 
markets. 
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- CAB: Current account balance as a percentage of GDP.  
- Higher power terms of the explanatory variables are also included to allow for 
non-linearity. For instance, a fast growing economy will attract foreign capital 
inflows and therefore have a large gross capital flow figure. On the other hand, an 
economy that has a negative growth rate may experience large capital outflows 
and therefore also have a large gross capital flow figure. 
- Interaction terms between explanatory variables, regional dummies, period 
dummies and a financial crisis dummy are also included. 
 
Data 
The data for AFPOI cover the post Asian financial crisis period of 1999-2003. In view of 
the year-to-year volatility in AFPOI, three year average values are used. Therefore, three 
periods of data are used, corresponding to the moving average of 1999-2001 (period 1), 
2000-2002 (period 2), and 2001-2003 (period 3). Three year average values of KAO of 
the same period are used as well. For all variables in ix , except GOV, lagged three year 
average values are used to mitigate year-to-year volatility and potential endogeneity 
problems with AFPOI. That is, the three periods of data for ix  are 1996-1998 (period 1), 
1997-1999 (period 2), and 1998-2000 (period 3).4 For GOV, the contemporaneous 
causality clearly runs in the direction of GOV to AFPOI and not vice versa as 
institutional sittings are slow to adjust; so endogeneity should not be a problem in this 
cross sectional model. Since data for GOV are only available for every two years, data 
from 2000 (period 1), the average of 2000 and 2002 (period 2), and 2002 (period 3) are 
used respectively. Data for these periods are pooled together to form a cross section data 
set of 273 observations for 91 countries. (Results of estimations using data of various 
sub-periods are reported in the Appendix for Referee.) We do not explore the possibility 
of using a panel data set with a longer time frame because the purpose of the paper is to 
examine the impact of China opening up the capital account in its contemporary 
condition rather than to explain the time series characteristics of capital movements. 
                                                 
4 The three year average is chosen because it is a good balance between having a sufficient length to 
average out year-to-year volatility on the one hand, and avoiding the lag between the explained and 
explanatory variables being too long on the other. 
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Also, the data for KAO and GOV are available only from 1996 onward, and we prefer to 
exclude the Asian financial crisis period; as a consequence, only data from 1999 onward 
are considered. Except KAO and GOV, the data are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators database.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
The results for the estimations are reported in Table 4. The t-statistics are 
heteroskedasticity consistent based on the correction suggested by White (1980). Model 1 
includes all regional dummies, two period dummies and a financial crisis dummy. The 
financial crisis dummy is set to 1 for countries that experienced a financial crisis during 
the sample period, including Argentina, Turkey and Brazil. All non-dummy variables are 
significant at 5 percent or lower level. However, amongst all the dummies, only 8 
regional dummies are significant at standard levels. The insignificant dummies are thus 
dropped and the results for the subsequent, more parsimonious Model 2 are also reported 
in Table 4. The omission of the insignificant dummies has little impact on the remaining 
variables in terms of sign, coefficient value or significance. Model 2 is thus considered 
the final model and the following discussion is based on its results.  
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Table 4. Regression Result 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Non-dummy explanatory variables Coefficient p value Coefficient p value 
SAVE -0.412 0.000 -0.407 0.000 
OPEN 0.128 0.000 0.130 0.000 
GDPC 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
GDPC^2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
GOV*ABS(GOV) 0.639 0.009 0.604 0.006 
GDPCG*ABS(GDPCG) 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.000 
KAO -3.116 0.074 -3.110 0.044 
KAO^2 0.709 0.044 0.713 0.024 
KAO^3 -0.036 0.058 -0.036 0.033 
KAO*GOV*OPEN 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 
KAO*GOV*CAB 0.035 0.007 0.035 0.004 
KAO*GOV*SAVE -0.023 0.005 -0.024 0.004 
KAO*GOV*FDI 0.017 0.008 0.018 0.005 
KAO^2*OPEN -0.001 0.037 -0.001 0.029 
Dummies   
Southeast and East Asia 15.975 0.003 16.133 0.000 
South and Central Asia 9.542 0.002 9.709 0.000 
Eastern Europe 7.199 0.033 7.378 0.003 
Western Europe 13.133 0.001 13.343 0.000 
North America 0.209 0.958   
Latin America 14.732 0.000 14.838 0.000 
Africa 8.273 0.003 8.443 0.000 
Middle East 9.513 0.036 9.518 0.019 
Caribbean 10.579 0.007 10.641 0.002 
Oceania -0.954 0.865   
Financial crisis -0.452 0.879   
Period 2 0.581 0.656   
Period 3 0.768 0.600   
   
R-squared 0.546 0.546  
Adjusted R-squared 0.498 0.508  
 
An outstanding feature of the results in Table 4 is that AFPOI is a highly non-linear 
function of the explanatory variables, with a number of interaction terms and higher 
power terms being significant. The use of the absolute value in the quadratic terms of 
GOV and GDPCG is to preserve their signs. Due to the existence of interaction terms, the 
marginal effects of many variables on AFPOI are conditional on the values of other 
variables. Nevertheless, higher level and growth rate of per capita GDP will have 
unambiguously positive, though small, impacts on AFPOI flows. Also, the magnitude of 
the coefficients suggest that the effects of national saving rate (SAVE), quality of 
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governance (GOV), and capital account openness (KAO) on AFPOI flows are likely to be 
large. 
 
The IMF’s measure of capital account openness, KAO, and the World Bank’s measure of 
governance, GOV, are not only significant on their own, but also significant in interaction 
with many other variables. Also prominent is that all interaction terms of KAO and GOV 
involve variables that are related to intertemporal substitution. For instance, savings and 
FDI are related to the intertemporal substitution of consumption between countries. Trade 
openness itself does not necessarily imply intertemporal substitution if the current 
account is largely in balance; however, the co-existence of interaction terms of trade 
openness and current account balance point to the role of trade in facilitating the 
intertemporal substitution of consumption and thus capital flows between countries. This 
finding also reveals the important role played by the private sector in determining capital 
flows. This is because while governments have some influence on intertemporal 
substitution via items such as the government spending and taxation, by and large FDI 
flows, trade flows and household savings are driven by the decisions of the private sector, 
even in a country with a large state sector like China. The implication is that as the 
private sector continues to increase its share in the Chinese economy, it will be 
increasingly difficult for the authorities to use a top-down approach to managing capital 
flows for any given degree of capital account openness. The recent episode of hot money 
inflows fueling property inflation is a case in point.  
 
The non-linearity of the estimated AFPOI function and the significance of several 
interaction terms related to institutional and intertemporal factors are clearly indicative of 
the process of capital account liberalization being a complex endeavor. The interrelation 
between variables highlights the fact that piecemeal institutional changes (e.g. a gradual 
integration into the international financial market) may not be sufficient in achieving an 
intended objective if the relationship between the targeted variable (i.e. KAO) and those 
that are interconnected (e.g. GOV and SAVE) is not well understood. This once again 
points to the prudence of being prepared for the impact wrought by higher degrees of 
capital account convertibility than liberalization policies are actually intended to achieve.   
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Simulation 
Based on the estimated model, Figure 4 shows the simulated value of AFPOI for China 
( CHNAFPOI ) as a function of KAO for given values of other variables as recorded in the 
dataset, which are listed under Figure 4. The schedule is drawn from the following 
simulation equation: 
 
 
2 310.520 3.110 (0.713 0.001 ) 0.036
(0.006 0.035 0.024 0.018 ) *
CHN CHN
CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN
AFPOI KAO OPEN KAO KAO
OPEN CAB SAVE FDI KAO GOV
= − + − −
+ + − +
(2) 
 
The constant term constant 10.520 is set in order to normalize the computed value of 
CHNAFPOI  to the observed value 8.4 when KAO is equal to 1.1 as recorded in the 
dataset. 
 
Figure 4. Simulated AFPOI for China 
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Values of variables for China used in stimulation: GOV = -0.74, OPEN = 44.38, CAB = 2.81, SAVE = 
5.05. 
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Figure 4 reflects the non-linear nature of AFPOI flows as captured by the higher power 
terms of KAO. We caution that one should avoid pointing to the precise predicted value 
of CHNAFPOI  associated with a particular value of KAO because of the qualitative data 
upon which KAO is constructed. We suggest a more appropriate interpretation of the 
simulation equation is that the squared and cubed terms of KAO are to keep the value of 
CHNAFPOI  bound and the other interaction terms are to capture some underlying 
intertemporal dynamics. In this sense, the schedule in Figure 4 can be viewed as a S-
curve with three segments: CHNAFPOI  remains low and stable when KAO lies between 
1-4, it then rises almost linearly up to KAO = 8, and then settles at a plateau at the high 
end of KAO between 8-11. Note that the fall at the very high end of KAO beyond 11 is 
rather deceptive. This is because, as seen in Table 3, the highest observed value of KAO 
in the sample is 12, and only two countries, Germany and the Netherlands, out of the 91 
countries have attained that value. 
 
In relation to the process of capital account liberalization, Figure 4 suggests that gradual 
capital account liberalization might initially be met with a muted capital flow response. 
As openness passes a certain threshold value, however, AFPOI starts to rise. The middle 
segment of the S-curve posits a steady increase in capital flows if the capital account can 
be gradually opened. The observed bipolar distribution of KAO values found in Figure 1 
however should be kept in mind. The figure indicates that most countries either make the 
choice to be substantially closed or substantially open, thereby containing the suggestion 
that medium levels of openness may be difficult to maintain in practice.  
 
Figure 4 indicates that if China completely opens up its capital account, its AFPOI flows 
would increase from the currently observed 8.4 percent of GDP (average over 1999-2003, 
see Table 1) to about 13.0 percent5, a 55 percent rise. An increase in AFPOI of this 
magnitude would represent a sizeable prudential challenge for the monetary authorities. 
The GITIC debacle showed that in the past the monetary authorities have struggled to 
exercise effective prudential monitoring even with a detailed system of controls 
                                                 
5 The figure is the average values of AFPOICHN  for KAO equal to 8, 9, 10 and 11respectively. 
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constraining the volume of capital flows. On the other hand, it should be recalled that the 
predicted increase in AFPOI is a gross figure and hence represents an upper bound for 
AFPOI inflows.  Also, given that during 1999-2003 the rate of gross capital formation 
averaged 38.6 percent of GDP, the fear that rising AFPOI inflows might worsen 
investment efficiency in China should not be exaggerated. What the findings imply is that 
investment efficiency will continue to be overwhelmingly determined by the manner in 
which domestic capital is allocated. In terms of whether capital account liberalization 
might endanger financial sector stability by compromising China’s international 
payments ability, the results suggest that China’s foreign reserves, which stood at nearly 
40 percent of GDP at year-end 2004, are more than adequate. In terms of the impact of 
China opening up its capital account on other countries, the 4.6 percentage point increase 
in AFPOI translates to an amount of US$53 billion.6 This amount is equivalent to a mere 
0.03 percent of the total FPOI for the world as a whole. If these additional capital flows 
are equally spread across the globe, the impact on individual countries appears very much 
manageable. Naturally, if additional capital flows concentrate on certain markets (i.e., 
certain countries or certain financial products), the impact will be more pronounced.7 One 
scenario worth contemplating is that Chinese investors might target the property and 
stock markets of its more developed economic annex – Hong Kong, and risk prompting 
another bubble crisis in that economy. Nonetheless, overall the findings suggest that the 
challenge in managing the opening China’s capital account rests far more on China itself 
than on its counterparts. 
 
By way of rounding up this section, two caveats regarding the simulation process are in 
order. Firstly, in the simulation we hold the values of all explanatory variables constant at 
their currently observed levels, except KAO. However, a deeper integration with the 
global financial market is likely to impact on some, if not all, of the explanatory variables 
in the long run. Therefore, the simulation result is better interpreted as being a short to 
                                                 
6 The figure is based on the average GDP measured in constant 2000 US dollar terms for China over 1999 
to 2003 is equal to $118 billion. 
7 If the distribution of China’s FDI stocks serves as a guide, the latter scenario is more likely to be the case. 
By 2003, FDI involving China displayed a strong orientation toward the US and Asia, with these two 
regions accounting for around 60 percent of the inward FDI stock in China and around 70 percent of 
China’s outward FDI stock by 2003 (UNCTAD 2004). 
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medium term result. Since three-year average values are used in the estimation and there 
is a three-year lag between the explained and explanatory variables, the short to medium 
term can be viewed as something between one to three years. Secondly, the expected 
capital flow response discussed above is based on the point estimates implied by the 
econometric model. The explanatory power of the model in terms of its adjusted R2 is 
around 0.5. While this is not a small number, clearly there remains a sizeable (and 
unavoidable) margin of error.  Nonetheless, we feel confident that most of our main 
conclusions are quite robust. For example, that rising capital account convertibility is 
unlikely to endanger China’s international payments ability is almost guaranteed by 
having foreign exchange reserves nearly 10 times greater than the level of AFPOI the 
model predicts would be associated with an entirely open capital account. Likewise, the 
fact that the predicted increase in gross AFPOI flows is only around 10 percent of gross 
capital formation means that even if one takes a dim view of the impact of rising capital 
account convertibility on investment efficiency, the scale to which this might occur is 
limited. Finally, the fractional predicted increase in China’s AFPOI flows as a percentage 
of global FPOI makes it hard to dispute that the real challenge of rising convertibility in 
China will rest far more on China itself than on its foreign counterparts. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to investigate the impact that rising capital account convertibility 
would have on the volume of China’s AFPOI flows. Gauging the magnitude of the capital 
flow response is important because, while both the opportunities and challenges posed by 
capital account liberalization are widely debated, the existing literature provides 
stakeholders with little quantitative guidance. The main findings of the paper are as 
follows.   
 
Firstly, for China (and many other countries), estimated unrecorded capital flows were 
found to be sizeable compared with recorded flows. This highlights the importance of 
accounting for unrecorded flows when estimating the extent to which a country is 
integrated into the global financial system and the expected capital flow response to 
rising capital account convertibility. It was also found that after accounting for 
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unrecorded flows, the effect of the de jure capital account regime on capital flows was 
somewhat diluted but far from being eliminated. Also, in years of financial turbulence the 
importance of unrecorded capital flows in total capital flows was seen to rise 
considerably. Together these findings imply that unofficial channels are not as effective 
as official ones in routing capital flows across border and capital controls do continue to 
bite. This in turn suggests that despite being partially undermined by unrecorded flows, 
capital controls can still provide the government with some room to maneuver monetary 
policy to deal with internal balance and the exchange rate to deal with external balance.  
 
Secondly, the econometric analysis predicts that if China were to lift all restrictions on 
capital flows, other things equal, AFPOI flows would rise by about 55 percent, or 4.6 
percent of GDP. Given the size of the Chinese economy, and the fact that at the monetary 
authorities have struggled to exercise effective prudential monitoring of international 
capital flows in the past, an increase of this magnitude would present a challenge to 
ensure that additional capital inflows do not reach speculative ends.  Nonetheless, the 
predictions of the model generally serve to allay fears associated with rising capital 
account convertibility. Increases in AFPOI inflows, which necessarily must be less than 
the gross predicted figure of 4.6 percent of GDP, are marginal compared with the rate of 
gross capital formation. The predicted volume of AFPOI under a completely opened 
capital account is also small compared with China’s stockpile of foreign exchange 
reserves, as is the size of the increase compared with global FPOI flows. Thus, the 
findings suggest that rising capital account convertibility is unlikely to trigger a capital 
flow response of sufficient magnitude to call into question financial sector stability, either 
in China or overseas.  
 
Thirdly, while the results suggest that capital account liberalization is unlikely to threaten 
financial sector stability, they do nonetheless point to the process as being a complex 
undertaking. The estimated capital flow function was highly non-linear in nature and 
consisted of economic and institutional variables, as well as interaction terms that related 
to intertemporal substitution. This makes predicting the impact of piecemeal changes in 
the level of capital account openness difficult. In addition, the fact that most variables 
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related to intertemporal substitution are largely determined by the private sector means 
that the extent in which the monetary authorities can stage manage the impact of rising 
levels of convertibility is limited. There is further the consideration that while the 
simulation equation suggested a steady increase in capital flows in response to a gradual 
opening of the capital account, the bipolar distribution of capital account openness 
amongst countries suggested that a capital control regime in the middle ground could be 
difficult to maintain in sheer practical terms. The key message, overall, is that the 
monetary authorities should prepare for higher levels of convertibility than that which 
their liberalization policies are intended to achieve. 
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